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A Law and Economics Critique
of the Law Review System
Timothy T. Lau
ABSTRACT
The law review system prizes placement of articles in highly-
ranked journals, and the optimum method to ensure the best place-
ment, which many scholars have intuited, is a saturation submis-
sion strategy of submitting articles to as many journals as possible.
However, there has neither been an explanation as to what incentiv-
izes this submission strategy nor any analysis as to what happens to
scholars who cannot afford this strategy. This article uses a law and
economics approach to study the incentive structures of the law re-
view system, and identifies two features of the system that encourage
saturation submission and punishes the poorly-resourced: (a) jour-
nals have no availability to accept all articles of equal quality; and
(b) there is an insufficient match between acceptance and journal
ranking. It demonstrates that the law review system behaves as a
market, and is meritocratic only for those scholars who can afford to
practice saturation submission. This article concludes with some
thoughts about reforming the system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law review system is central to the enterprise of legal schol-
arship. Faculty hiring,' tenure decisions,2 and even salarieS3 are
dependent on the number of publications placed in highly-ranked
journals. To that end, the quality of law faculties and, by extension,
1. See, e.g., anonprof, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3, 2017,
8:49 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-
2017/comments/page/14/#comments ("I have chaired my school's appointments committee
several times, and I talk quite a bit with chairs at other schools. Here's my opinion-we are
impressed by publications that we immediately know are 'good.' What determines good can
be the prestige of the journal, but more often, it's the perceived prestige of the school. Thus,
a publication in the flagship journal in any school in the T30 of U.S. News will get our atten-
tion-probably true of the T50 as well (although the closer you get to 50, the less that's the
case).").
2. See, e.g., AnonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 2, 2016
10:11 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-spring-
2016/comments/page/4/#comments ("Look, the sad truth is rarely will people read your work,
but many in your career will read your CV. They'll look over your publications and they will
absolutely use your placements as a proxy for how good a scholar you are. When it's tenure
time, you're [sic] faculty (whether they admit it or not) will be considering your placements .
... Thus, nobody is saying any journals are unworthy, but it's foolish to not try and get the
highest placement you can-especially if you're a relatively new prof[essor] with unfulfilled
career aspirations.").
3. See, e.g., Anonymouse, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 28,
2017, 9:57 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/11/#comments ("for many of us our annual compensation is im-
pacted by article placement."); Furball, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Mar. 8, 2017, 11:17 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-
angsting-spring-2017/comments/page/17/#comments ("I am curious. For how many of you
does summer research funding depend on publishing above a certain point, e.g., top 50[?] I
will go first. Mine does."); Westie, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar.
12, 2017, 10:51 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-ang-
sting-spring-2017/comments/page/19/#comments ("at my school (and a number of others) our
summer compensation and merit based pay raises turn on prestige of journal placement-
low enough placement and you essentially forfeit a month of salary.").
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the research they produce, rely on the integrity of the system. It is
therefore of critical importance to identify elements of the system
that are not meritocratic or unfair so that the system can be reme-
died to properly reward the best scholarship.
Although the system has been characterized as a black box,4 par-
ticipants within it have by experience converged upon certain strat-
egies to deal with its peculiarities. For example, it is generally
agreed that the best way to guarantee the best placement of an ar-
ticle is to submit to as many journals as possible, that is, saturation
submission.5 But what makes saturation submission the best strat-
egy? And what happens to those who cannot afford to execute sat-
uration submission?
The law review system is actually quite amenable to analysis.
The rules, such as how the submission system operates, are clear,
and it is therefore possible to examine the incentive structure that
results. And although data is hard to come by, there are some sta-
tistics and clues about demonstrated preferences, for example, on
PrawfsBlawg, which serves in part as a gossip site for legal schol-
ars.6
This article utilizes the law and economics approach to study the
law review system itself. It beings by outlining the "law" that gov-
erns the system, namely, the peculiarities of articles submission as
well as the ranking of the journals. It then analyzes the strategies
and outcomes using an idealized system, and, by adding realistic
constraints to the system, shows how the system creates a market
structure that encourages saturation submission and disad-
vantages the scholars who cannot afford to do so. It concludes with
some proposals about reforming the system.
From a broader perspective, the ills of the law review system are
simply too deep and too numerous to be addressed in any single
article.7 To that end, the reader is highly encouraged to refer to the
4. See Brian Galle, The Law Review Submission Process: A Guide for (and by) the Per-
plexed 1 (Aug. 12, 2016) (Georgetown University Law Center), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2822501 ("No one really understands the law review publica-
tion process. I certainly don't.").
5. Id. at 5 ("The game is that one first submits to a very large number of journals.").
6. For example, PrawfsBlawg has an "angsting" thread for every submission season,
where legal scholars discuss which journals have accepted their articles and how journal
acceptances should be weighed. See, e.g., Law Review Submission Angsting Thread: Fall
2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 4, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/08/law-
review-submission-angsting-thread-fall-2017.html. The information posted on these threads
provide a glimpse into the behavior of actual legal scholars.
7. For other problems with the law review system that have been oted by scholars, see
Leah M. Christensen & Julie A. Oseid, Navigating the Law Review Article Selection Process:
An Empirical Study of Those With All the Power-Student Editors, 59 S.C. L. REV. 175 (2007)
(analyzing some of the problematic factors, such as a reviewer's ability to recognize the school
371
Duquesne Law Review
forthcoming essay, "Law Review Publishing: Thoughts on Mass
Submissions, Expedited Reviews, and Potential Reforms," by Mi-
chael Cicchini.8 Unlike this article, which examines the law review
system from a systematic point of view, Cicchini's essay takes a
more granular look at the morally questionable practices used by
individual legal scholars to enhance their article placement. This
article and Cicchini's article are independently written; however,
the reader may consider the two articles as companion pieces in
their criticisms of the entire law review system.
II. HOW THE LAW REVIEW SYSTEM OPERATES
In order to analyze the law review system using the law and eco-
nomics approach, it is important to first identify the underlying
"laws." Readers who are regular users of the system will be well
familiar with these "laws," but it is useful to briefly set forth the
essentials as a basis for discussion.
A. Peculiarities of Law Journal Submissions
As in all fields of academia, authors submit their research articles
to journals, which decide whether or not to publish the articles.
However, there are a few distinguishing features with regard to law
journals, as compared to, for example, scientific journals.9
First, legal scholars generally do not submit articles to journals
on an exclusive basis. Authors may submit to any number of jour-
nals and pick the most desirable among the offers. Desirability will
be addressed in a subsequent discussion; for now, it is sufficient to
note that it is not unheard of for authors to simultaneously submit
a single article to 100 journals.10
at which the author teaches, used in article publication decisions), Richard A. Posner, Against
the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFFAIRS (2004), https://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-De-
cember-2004/reviewposnernovdecO4.msp (noting that the background of law review editors
may not equip them to review papers on interdisciplinary work), and Richard A. Wise et al.,
Do Law Reviews Need Reform? A Survey of Law Professors, Student Editors, Attorneys, and
Judges, 59 LOY. L. REV. 1, 8-24 (2013) (summarizing common criticisms of the law review
system).
8. Michael D. Cicchini, Law Review Publishing: Thoughts on Mass Submissions, Expe-
dited Reviews, and Potential Reforms, 16 U. N.H. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
9. For a brief description of the typical journal submission process in an area of study
outside of law, see Posner, supra note 7. For an example of the policy of a scientific journal,
see Science: Editorial Policies, SCIENCE, http://www.sciencemag.org/authors/science-edito-
rial-policies (last visited Sept. 1, 2017).
10. See, e.g., Anotheranon, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 29,
2016, 11:11 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2016/comments/page/7/#comments ("My suggestion would be to submit much more
broadly (think at least 100 journals, not 30).").
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Second, authors are generally required to pay a submission fee.
While some journals have allowed submission through emails for
free,"1 as of this writing, a large number of law journals accept ar-
ticles exclusively through Scholastica, which charges authors a $5
"management charge" for each submission to each journal.12 This
can easily lead to expenditures of hundreds of dollars to have an
article published.13 It should be noted that Scholastica increased
the price for submissions to $6.50 in early 2017, a 30% price hike.14
Third, law articles are generally selected by student editors of
journals, not by peer review.15 Some of the most prestigious jour-
nals may incorporate some element of review by scholars into their
review process,16 but the ultimate decisions about publishing reside
with student editors. Purely peer-reviewed journals, such as the
Journal of Legal Education, are rare.
Fourth, because authors may submit to multiple journals at once,
the expedite mechanism exists o that an author can alert more de-
sirable journals about acceptance from a less desirable journal.1 7
That way, the more desirable journals can be prompted to decide
whether to accept the article before the offer for acceptance from
the less desirable journal expires.
B. Ranking of Law Journals
To understand how journals are ranked, it is important to note
that each school generally produces a "flagship" journal, such as
Stanford Law Review. Some may have "niche" journals focused on
11. For a summary of the submission policies of 203 law journals, see Allen Rostron &
Nancy Levit, Information for Submitting Articles to Law Reviews & Journals (July 2017)
(University of Missouri at Kansas City School of Law), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstractid=1019029.
12. The Top Choice Among Law Reviews for Article Selection, SCHOLASTICA, https://scho-
lasticahq.com/law-reviews (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
13. See, e.g., Anonymous, Submission Angsting Fall 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 7, 2016,
6:17 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/submission-angsting-fall-
2016/comments/page/2/#comments ("I have spent about $300 for my current submission.");
Anonymouse, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:57 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-2017/com-
ments/page/11/#comments ("I think I have racked up about $650 in submission fees which
fortunately my school pays for.").
14. January 2017 Law Review Submission Price Update, SCHOLASTICA, http://blog.scho-
lasticahq.com/post/law-review-submission-price-update/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
15. Posner, supra note 7.
16. Galle, supra note 4, at 13.
17. A complete description of the expedite practice is beyond the scope of this article. For
more, see Cicchini, supra note 8, at 7.
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specific topics, such as Stanford Technology Law Review. Publica-
tion in the "flagship" journal commands more respect than publica-
tion in a "niche" journal of the same school.
What is more complicated is how scholars compare journals pub-
lished by different schools. The consensus is that legal academics
rank journals by the U.S. News & World Report ranking of the law
school publishing the law review.1 8 That is, if William & Mary
ranks as 33 according to the magazine, then William & Mary Law
Review ranks as 33 among the "flagship" journals.
There exists a seemingly never-ending dispute among legal schol-
ars about how the "niche" journals published by higher-ranked
schools should be ranked against the "flagship" journals of lower-
ranked schools. Brian Galle, a tax scholar, provides this perspec-
tive:
I have heard international law scholars say that placing
with Harvard's international-law journal [i.e., Harvard In-
ternational Law Journal] is almost as good as placing in
the Harvard Law Review. Let me be blunt. That is absurd.
For most purposes, specialty placements are not as valua-
ble as general-interest journal placements, and a 40- or 50-
place discount seems closer to my sense of the difference
than 20. Certainly, I would never take a [Virginia Tax Re-
view] placement over, say, the Emory Law Journal. But
this can vary by field and by journal ....
There is probably a premium for the very top specialty jour-
nals. I might put outlets such as the Yale Journal on Reg-
ulation in or close to the top 20, while some Columbia or
Virginia journals, say, are probably best measured by add-
ing 50 or more.19
18. Id. at 4. It should be noted that, for purposes of ranking journals, some scholars
prefer the use of the peer assessment score, one of the factors used by the U.S. News & World
Report to determine its overall rankings, instead of the overall rankings themselves. See,
e.g., anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 8, 2017, 11:11 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-spring-2016/com-
ments/page/7/#comments ("[T]he general USNWS rankings are unhelpf [sic] for gauging the
quality of law reviews. Use the peer assessment scores instead, they are typically consistent
year-to-year: http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprofblog/2016/03/2017-us-news-peer-reputation
-rankings-v-overall-rankings.htm."). The peer assessment score is determined by surveys of
"law school deans, deans of academic affairs, chairs of faculty appointments and the most
recently tenured faculty members," who are asked to "rate programs [of peer schools] on a
scale from marginal (1) to outstanding (5)." Robert Morse, Methodology: 2017 Best Law
Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 16, 2016, 9:30 PM), http://www.us-
news.com/education/best-graduate-schools/articles/law-schools-methodology.
19. Galle, supra note 4, at 9.
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Here is a slightly different take, from an exchange between schol-
ars on PrawfsBlawg:
I received two offers in the past day. One from a T50-60
general law review, and one from one of the top 3 specialty
law journals. Thoughts on which is better?20
Posted by: Anon
There are different ways to think about it. For me, the most
important is to decide who I hope will read the article. If I
am really hoping to reach colleagues in my field, and not
much beyond, then I would take the offer from the top 5
specialty journal, which has a good chance of being read
regularly by lots of scholars in the field (who might not see
the piece if published in a main-line law rev[iew])[.] If the
piece contains important themes that transcend the spe-
cialty categories, then I might go for the main-line law jour-
nal.
Another way to look at it is from the perspective of the
Dean's/faculty's review criteria at your school. Will one
type of publication "count" more than another in terms of
future research grants etc.?
Posted by: crimprof21
Some scholars treat publication in a specialty journal as a mark of
failure:
Generally, I think placing in a specialty journal is a bad
idea. Unless it's a super well-regarded specialty, I view
such placements as a signal that the author failed to get a
decent offer from a general journal.
20. Anon, Submission Angsting Fall 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 2, 2016, 8:02 AM), http://
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/submission-angsting-fall-2016/
comments/page/1/#comments.






There are a number of practical problems with using the U.S.
News & World Report rankings of law schools to rank the journals
they publish.23 First, the method simply cannot account for jour-
nals that are not affiliated with a law school. Examples of such
journals include the Journal of Legal Education, a publication of
the Association of American Law Schools, and the Federal Courts
Law Review, a publication of the Federal Magistrate Judges Asso-
ciation.
Second, the law school rankings of U.S. News & World Report do
not take into account the quality of the journals that the law schools
publish. Rather, the magazine ranks law schools based on factors
such as peer assessments, selectivity, and success in job placement
of graduating students.24 That the U.S. News & World Report ranks
schools without a consideration of journal quality is well under-
standable; after all, the magazine is publishing the rankings for
prospective students to decide which school to attend.25 However,
by using the U.S. News & World Report rankings of law schools to
rank journals, legal academics are taking the rankings far beyond
their intended use and essentially are ranking journals based on
factors that have little to do with the journals themselves.
Legal scholars are virtually unique in ranking journals in such a
way. Scientists, for example, have their own disagreements about
how to rank journals; the predominant method of using journal im-
pact factors published by Thomson Reuters is particularly contro-
versial.26 Nonetheless, journal impact factors are still based on
counts of citations to articles within the journals.27 Whether or not
22. AnonHiringChair, Submission Angsting Fall 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 23, 2016,
9:39 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/submission-angsting-fall-2016
/comments/page/4/#comments.
23. Best Law Schools Ranked in 2017, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, https://www.us-
news.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (la t visited Sept. 6, 2017).
24. Morse, supra note 18.
25. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 23 (introducing the rankings with these two
sentences: "A career in law starts with finding the school that fits you best. With the U.S.
News rankings of the top law schools, narrow your search by location, tuition, school size and
test scores.").
26. Ewen Callaway, Beat It, Impact Factor! Publishing Elite Turns Against Controversial
Metric, NATURE (July 12, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/beat-it-impact-factor-publish-
ing-elite-turns-against-controversial-metric- 1.20224. The journal impact factors are made
available at present by Thomson Reuters through a service called the Journal Citation Re-
ports. While the reader would not be able to access the rankings without a subscription, the
reader can get a sense of what the service is about by browsing through its website at
http://about.jcr.incites.thomsonreuters.com/.
27. Eugene Garfield, The Clarivate Analytics Impact Factor, CLARIVATE ANALYTICS,
http://wokinfo.com/essays/impact-factor/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) ("The impact factor is one
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citation count is a fair reflection of the journal's quality is certainly
debatable, but the count is undoubtedly an attribute of the journals
themselves. The same could not be said of ranking law journals
based on the U.S. News & World Report law school rankings.
There do exist journal ranking systems within the law review sys-
tem that take into account the attributes of the journals. For ex-
ample, the law library of Washington and Lee University School of
Law maintains a system that ranks law journals by citation counts
and impact factor.28 Likewise, Google Scholar produces a ranking
of journals based on the number of citations.29 However, these sys-
tems have not gained the popularity of the method of using the U.S.
News & World Report rankings of law schools to rank the journals
they publish. 30
The best and most convincing explanation for this behavior of le-
gal scholars is laziness. As a scholar noted on PrawfsBlawg:
Here's my thoughts-always go with U.S. News. The rea-
son is that people reviewing your CV tend to have an idea
of where that journal's school is ranked; nobody walks
around with encyclopedic knowledge of W&L rankings, nor
will most take the time to look it up. For instance, W&L
ranks Lewis and Clark as #40 (USNEWS ranking = 92) and
Alabama as #41 (USNEWS ranking = 28). NOBODY would
consider a L&C placement as even comparable to an Ala-
bama placement, much less superior.31
If you're someone who is publishing in hopes of getting
hired into a tenure track position, please don't fool yourself
into thinking that those who will be evaluating your candi-
dacy will spend the time asking themselves, of the journals
you've published in, how widely read they are and whether
of these; it is a measure of the frequency with which the 'average article' in a journal has
been cited in a particular year or period.").
28. Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking Explained, WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIV.
LAW SCH. OF LAW LAW LIBRARY, http://lawlib.wlu.edulLJ/method.asp (last visited Dec. 7,
2016).
29. Robert Anderson, Google Law Review Rankings 2015, WITNESSETH: LAW, DEALS, &
DATA (Feb. 15, 2016), http://witnesseth.typepad.com/blog/2016/02/google-law-review-rank-
ings-2015.html.
30. Galle, supra note 4, at 8 ("Q: U.S. News rankings or Washington & Lee rankings? A:
U.S. News peer reputation score. Q: Really? People don't care about Washington & Lee? A:
I mean, W&L itself has several different rankings systems. Who could possibly keep track
of which journal is ranked where in which ranking?").





that journal typically publishes "good" articles. Instead,
it'll be a relatively snap judgement of 1) have I heard of this
journal before and 2) how well regarded is the school to
which it is attached.32
Legal scholars are already well-versed in the law school rankings
of the U.S. News & World Report. To use alternative rankings to
judge the quality of the journals, they would need to take the actual
effort to look up these alternative rankings. In contrast, it is a triv-
ial exercise to discern from the name of a law journal which law
school published the journal and then to apply the U.S. News &
World Report ranking of the law school to rank the journal.
C. Player Strategy within the Law Review System
Legal scholars have converged on a strategy to deal with the law
review system: submission by saturation, and then work up the
rankings using the expedite system. Here is a description provided
by Galle:
The game is that one first submits to a very large number
of journals. After receiving an initial offer, one then send[s]
requests for expedited review to journals that you prefer to
the offering journal, but which are not far, far, higher
ranked than the offering journal. A typical heuristic is to
expedite to the next 50 or so higher-ranked journals. One
then hopes for another offer from that grouping, and then
sends news of the two offers to the next 50. And so on, po-
tentially.33
As far as this author can tell, players have arrived at this strat-
egy by experience and not by actual analysis. It is one aim of this
article to explain why saturation submission exists.
That each submission costs $5 or $6.50 means that saturation
submission can be costly to implement, particularly for junior schol-
ars unaffiliated with an institution who cannot rely on an institu-
tional account and have to pay out of their own pockets. Some au-
thors simply cannot afford this strategy at all. It is another aim of
32. AnonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 18, 2017, 2:36
PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-2017/
comments/page/6/#comments.
33. Galle, supra note 4, at 5.
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this article to broadly explain the negative impact of authors' finan-
cial constraints on their article placements.
III. THE IDEALIZED LAW REVIEW SYSTEM
To understand which part of the real-world law review system
results in the strategies and outcomes we empirically observe, we
begin by analyzing an idealized law review system.
A. Properties of the Idealized System
To simplify our analysis, we will assume a universe of 100 jour-
nals. All will be assumed to be "flagship" journals; we will ignore
the complexity of "niche" journals. Of these 100, we will assume
that the U.S. News & World Report rankings govern preferences for
publication offers. To make the numbers easier to interpret, we will
assume that the submission fee is the old, round figure of $5 instead
of the new, increased cost of $6.50.
As in real life, the top 3 journals will be assumed not to charge a
submission fee.3 4 Of the other 97, 10 others will be assumed to be
willing to accept articles by email; that is, they have an avenue for
submission without fees. These 13 journals will be collectively re-
ferred to as the "free journals" and their ranks are assumed to be
evenly distributed throughout the ranking spectrum.3 5 All others
are assumed to accept articles exclusively through Scholastica.
We will further assume that there actually exists an objective
grading of articles as deserving of a journal of a particular rank. In
other words, we will assume that it is possible to say, "this article
is worthy of The University of Chicago Law Review." In the real
world, it is difficult to assign such grades or even to ascertain what
factors should govern the grading. But we intuitively do know that
some articles deserve to be placed in journals of higher rank than
others, so this assumption is not overly unrealistic. We will also
34. Yale Law Journal, Harvard Law Review, and Stanford Law Review have their pro-
prietary submissions systems that do not require a charge.
35. We make the assumption that the free journals are evenly distributed throughout
the ranking spectrum because it preserves a translational symmetry. In other words, the
handicap to an article resulting from the author's financial constraints is the same whether
the article merits to be published in the journal ranked 34 or the journal ranked 72. But in
reality, as of spring of 2017, there are 40 journals that accept articles exclusively through
Scholastica. Of these, 35 are in the top 50, based on the U.S. News & World Report rankings.
This concentration of journals that demand submission fees on the higher end of the ranking




assume that authors will accept the highest-ranked journal that ac-
cepts their articles.36
Finally, we will assume that journals have perfect judgment
about article merit relative to their ranks and have an infinite ca-
pacity to accept articles worthy of their ranks. We will return to
these last two assumptions in a subsequent discussion.
B. Scholars with Infinite Resources
At one extreme are the scholars with an infinite amount of re-
sources. These could include, for example, well-entrenched profes-
sors who can call upon secretaries to manage article submissions
and cover letter preparations as well as charge the Scholastica fees
to research accounts. They would also include law firm partners
who can impose the drudge work on associates and bill the costs to
"business development."
For these individuals, the marginal cost of an article submission
is basically zero.37 However, for them, there is always a positive
marginal benefit to article submission because they stand a better
chance at a higher journal placement with another submission.38
These incentives govern their submission strategy. Because the
marginal benefits to an article submission always exceed the mar-
ginal costs, in practical terms, these individuals will submit their
articles to every journal in existence. When they receive offers for
publication, they will use the offers to expedite review at higher-
ranked journals.
In our idealized system, the net amount these individuals spend
would be $5 for each of the 87 journals that requires a submission
fee, totaling $435. In real life, these individuals would hardly
bother themselves with the more troublesome avenue of submitting
to the free journals by emails rather than through Scholastica,
which would result in a net amount spent closer to $500.39
36. This assumption may not hold true in real-life. For more, see infra note 58 and ac-
companying text and Cicchini, supra note 8.
37. In layman's terms, the marginal cost is the value of what one would have to give up
in order to obtain an additional unit. Because the law firm partners and professors have
some other entity to pay for their submissions, they do not really give up any value in sub-
mitting one more article and so the marginal cost of an article submission for them is basi-
cally zero. Of course, the marginal cost to the entity actually paying for the submission is
not zero.
38. The marginal benefit is the value of what one would give up to acquire an additional
unit. The point at which people would stop acquiring units would be the point at which
marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit.
39. Scholastica essentially allows authors to select a number of journals into a "shopping
cart" and mass submit one article to all the journals in the cart at once. This is, obviously,
more convenient than submitting articles to journals one-by-one. The interactive system of
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These individuals can be assured that their articles will receive
the placement they deserve. Situations may arise where, by over-
playing their hand, they spoil their article placement. For example,
an author can face the problem where a higher-ranked journal re-
fuses to consider her article before the deadline of a publication of-
fer extended by a lower-ranked journal, and the author, being over-
confident, turns down the lower-ranked journal only to find the
work rejected by the higher-ranked journal. But in general, no one
is in a better position to claim the rightful placement for his or her
work than these well-resourced scholars.
C. Scholars with Very Limited Resources
At the other extreme are the scholars with very few resources.
Examples of such individuals include those who are in the faculty
job market or in government employment who have to pay the sub-
mission fees out of their own pockets.
As a simplification, we will first consider those who are com-
pletely cash-strapped. The strategy of these poorly-resourced schol-
ars is easy enough to predict. They will submit their articles to all
the free journals.40 Because they have no money to spend, they will
stop at this step and accept the best offer they have.
The placement of the articles these individuals produce relative
to the intrinsic merit of the articles is heavily dependent on the dis-
tribution of free journals in the journal hierarchy. Let us assume,
for example, that a completely cash-strapped individual has an ar-
ticle worthy of placement in the journal ranked 34. In an even dis-
tribution of free journals across the hierarchy, say, the journals
ranked 30 and 40 are free, the individual may be able to place her
article in a journal ranked 40. It is a slight dent, not entirely dam-
aging, to the placement. However, if there is a big gap in the rank-
ings between the free journals, say, the journals ranked 30 and 60
are the two free journals closest in rank, then this author would be
Scholastica is best appreciated by directly testing it out, but a written description can be
found at https://blog.scholasticahq.com/post/announcing-improved-law-review-article-sub-
mission-on-scholastical.
40. This analysis ignores the transaction costs associated with free submissions which
further complicate the problem for poorly-resourced scholars. First, submission by email
relative to Scholastica entails a much larger investment of time. Second, the journals that
accept submissions by email often openly state their preference for submissions through
Scholastica. See, e.g., Submissions, PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW, http://pepperdinelawre-
view.com/submit/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) ("Although submission via email or U.S. mail to
the addresses below is acceptable, we strongly prefer submissions via Scholastica."). All of
the uncertainty and effort associated with free submissions constitute transaction costs.
Still, we would have to imagine that most poorly-resourced scholars would not opt for Scho-
lastica over email; after all, a $5 submission fee per journal adds up very, very quickly.
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forced to publish in the journal ranked 60. That is a massive drop
in placement.
D. Scholars in Between the Two Extremes
Most scholars, we would think, will likely fall somewhere in be-
tween the two extremes of the infinitely-resourced and the com-
pletely cash-strapped. For example, these authors may have a $100
budget to spend as opposed to $435 at one extreme and $0 at the
other. And this is where the considerations for article placement
become most complex and interesting.
A simple analysis would suggest that these authors would adopt
a strategy between those used by persons at the two extremes. That
is, these authors should try to use the $100 to submit to 20 journals,
which, added to the 13 free journals, tallies to submissions to 33
journals within the entire pool of 100. They would attempt to
evenly spread out the distribution of these 33 submissions, that is,
one submission for every 3 ranks, so as to best approximate the
spectrum of the 100 journals.
To that end, with $100, they can cover roughly one-third of the
journals considered in the idealized system. That would seem like
a fair amount of coverage and will seem to guarantee that the arti-
cle will not be published in a journal significantly lower than where
it deserves to be.4 1
As we can see, even this idealized system rewards the saturation
submission strategy, although the benefits are not significant. The
situation changes completely when we consider other realities of
the law review system.
IV. ADDING REALISTIC CONSTRAINTS TO THE IDEALIZED SYSTEM
A. No Journal Accepts All Articles Deserving of Its Rank
In reality, no journal accepts all articles that deserve to be pub-
lished in it. A large number of reasons, many of which are legiti-
mate, govern these considerations. For example, a journal may not
be interested in the subject matter of a well-deserving article at a
particular time. A journal may also have already accepted all of the
articles it could accept for a particular submission season.
41. Because they submit to one journal in every three ranks, these authors would place
their articles in journals at most two ranks below where their articles deserve to be.
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The key effect of this resource constraint is to turn the idealized
system from deterministic to probabilistic. 42 An author has some
chance of being published in a higher-ranked journal than his arti-
cle merits, for example, if there were not enough better articles to
fill the higher-ranked journal. Alternatively, in the more likely
case, the abundance of higher-quality articles may create an over-
flow of articles in higher-ranked journals and push his article to a
lower placement than where it actually deserves to be placed.
The precise effect of the resource constraint is dependent on the
number of articles in the system, the distribution in the quality of
these articles, and the specific submission strategies of each author.
But still, even with the resource constraint, the probability of hav-
ing an article accepted in a lower-ranked journal is never lower
than that of having an article accepted in a higher-ranked journal.
In other words:
Probabilityacceptance (lower-ranked) Probabilityacceptance (higher-ranked)
This insight allows us to construct a simple test. Let us assume
there were multiple authors who produced articles worthy of place-
ment in the journal ranked 34. Let us assume also that all the jour-
nals ranked in the 30's are full, but one journal ranked in the 40's,
two journals ranked in the 50's, three journals ranked in the 60's,
etc., will accept these articles.
In this situation, the author who could submit to all 100 journals
may not be able to place her article in the journal ranked 34, even
though that is where her article deserves to be published. However,
because she submits her article to all the journals, she will be able
to publish in that one journal ranked in the 40's that would accept
her article.
As stated above, the author with a $100 budget can submit to
only one-third of the available journals. This essentially means
that he can submit to every third journal according to the rankings.
As a simplification, this author can submit to three journals in each
decile. To be published in the journal ranked in the 40's that will
accept his article, it becomes a question of probability whether he
picked the correct journal with his three submissions within that
decile.
Without a full explanation of the mathematics, we have tabulated
the probabilities of acceptance at every decile for authors who can
42. A deterministic system, unlike a probabilistic system, is one in which there is no
randomness involved in determining the outcome.
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only afford: (A) three submissions for every decile; (B) two submis-
sions for every decile; and (C) one submission for every decile. Ex-



















































































Table 1: Probabilities of Acceptances for Different Submission Frequencies
The expected rank of the placement is a probability-weighted av-
erage,4 6 which we can tabulate as follows:
43. There are three journals in this decile willing to accept the article, and the author
has three submissions within this decile. There are seven journals within this decile which
will not accept the article, so the probability of the first of these three submissions not being
accepted is 7/10. For the second of these three submissions, there are only six out of nine
journals which will not accept the article. Accordingly, the probability of rejection decreases
to 6/9. The overall probability of no journal within this decile accepting the article is:
7 6 5- x-x-= 0.29.
10 9 8
44. This is simply 1 minus the probability of no journal accepting the article in this decile,
so: 1 - 0.29 = 0.71.
45. The probability of the article being accepted in the 60's without being accepted in any
journal ranked above is: 0.70x0.47x0.71 = 0.23. The probability of the article being accepted
in any journal ranked in the 60's and above is therefore: 0.23 + 0.67 = 0.90.
46. The precise formula is:
Expected Rank = 100 - I (Probabilitypacement(rank)x(100 - rank)
384
Summer 2017 Critique of the Law Review System 385
3 2 1
Saturation Submissions Submissions Submission
Submission Every Decile Every Decile Every Decile
Expected 45 5647 61 71
Journal Rank
of Article
Table 2: Expected Placement for Different Submission Frequencies
Even in this simple system, the penalty in journal rank is steep
for those who cannot afford saturation submission. The author who
spends $100 versus $435 places 11 ranks lower. If the acceptance
statistics are more stringent, say, 0.5 acceptances in the 40's, 1 in
the 50's, 1.5 in the 60's, etc., the penalty would be even harsher.4 8
However, there is a bigger problem still for the poorly-resourced
authors.
B. Acceptance Statistics Lack a Good Match with Journal Rank
As stated, even with the resource constraint:
Probabilityacceptance (lower-ranked) Probabilityacceptance (higher-ranked)
Intuitively, we would think that it should be easier to place in a
lower-ranked journal than in a higher-ranked journal and that the
probabilities should so reflect. But is that true?
Available data on how articles placed in high-ranked journals
fared in lower-ranked journals is rare,49 but some can be found on
the "Submission Angsting Spring 2016" thread of PrawfsBlawg.50
A small number of scholars have reported acceptance and rejection
It is necessary to subtract the rank from 100 and then subtract he ultimate sum from 100
because the ranking system is inverted from actual preference. For example, it is more pref-
erable to be published in a journal ranked 40 rather than a journal ranked 90. The subtrac-
tion corrects for this artificial inversion.
47. This figure is tabulated using the formula stated in footnote 46 and using the num-
bers in Table 1 as follows: 100 - (45x0.30 + 55x(0.67 - 0.30) + 65x(0.90 - 0.67) + 75x
(0.98 - 0.90) + 85x(1.00 - 0.98) + 95x(1.00 - 1.00)) = 56.34 ~ 56.
48. The reader can calculate the penalty using the example calculations provided in Ta-
ble 1 and Table 2. Under this new distribution, the expected journal rank for the author who
spends $100 versus $435 is 65, that is, 20 ranks lower.
49. Authors generally withdraw submissions to lower-ranked journals after receiving of-
fers for publication from higher-ranked journals. Accordingly, there will always be little data
on whether lower-ranked journals would have accepted articles placed in higher-ranked jour-
nals.
50. Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 2, 2016), http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-spring-2016.html.
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statistics, which, although probably incomplete, is sufficient for our
analysis here.


































Table 3: Statistics from "Submission Angsting Spring 2016" Thread of
PrawfsBlawg
There appears to be very little correlation between journal rank-
ing and acceptance. The highest-ranked journal that accepted
"Taking Care of Business"'s article was ranked 65. The same article
was also accepted by the journal ranked 74. However, the article
was also rejected by journals ranked 65 (x2),5 1 72, 82, 97, and 100.
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51. There were 7 law schools ranked 65. Michael Spivey, USNWR Schools Ranked 1-100,
SPIVEY CONSULTING (Mar. 9, 2016), http://blog.spiveyconsulting.com/usnwr-schools-ranked-
1-50-now-with-from-last-year/. "Taking Care of Business" reported submitting to 3 journals
from these 7 schools.
** *
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"Magnolia" had his or her article accepted at the journal ranked
45. The article was also accepted at the journal ranked 72. How-
ever, the article was rejected at journals ranked 55, 65 (x2), and
100.
"Bartok" and "Abominable Snowman in the Market" are particu-
larly worth comparing. Both reported acceptance at the same jour-
nal ranked 22. "Bartok" also reported acceptance at the journal
ranked 20; however, he or she reported rejections at journals
ranked 33 (x2), 37, and 55 and no other acceptances from journals
ranked below 22. "Abominable Snowman in the Market" appar-
ently only had one acceptance; his or her article was rejected at
journals ranked 33, 38, 48, and 55.
Accordingly, these data, incomplete though they are, suggest that
this equation may not hold true in the real world:
Probabilityacceptance (lower-ranked) Probabilityacceptance (higher-ranked)
There are two possible causes. First, journals may not be very
good at judging the merit of articles relative to their ranks, or they
simply may not judge articles based on their ranks at all. Second,
journal acceptances may be clustered around particular deciles or,
in other words, journals ranked below where the articles deserve to
be published have a tendency to reject the articles. For example,
we can observe that "Taking Care of Business" received acceptances
from journals ranked in the 61-80 range but found rejections in the
journals ranked below 80.
There are simply not enough data to support either one conclu-
sion or the other, although we have reason to be skeptical of the
second. For lower-ranked journals to reject articles that are, for all
intents and purposes, "too good" for them to publish essentially re-
quires journals to have an extremely good grasp of the quality of
articles they can realistically hope to publish. However, law jour-
nals have a yearly turnover of staff, so it is difficult for them to re-
tain an institutional knowledge about which of their offers to pub-
lish will be accepted.52 Also, while we are not privy to the discussion
in the editorial offices of lower-ranked journals, it seems implausi-
ble that student editors would vote to reject articles on the ground
52. The policy of Duquesne Law Review about how the journal takes on members every
year can be found at http://www.duqlawblogs.org/lawreview/membership/. The process uti-
lized by Duquesne Law Review is typical.
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that articles were "too good."5 3 Moreover, lower-ranked journals
can always count on higher-ranked journals not to accept all of the
best articles; rejecting articles "too good" for them would mean pub-
lishing inferior articles overall.
Regardless, either possibility is bad news for poorly-resourced au-
thors. If journals do not accept articles in accordance with their
ranks, then the system approaches randomness. The best strategy
for obtaining a good placement for any particular article will be
complete and total saturation submission.
The best strategy for dealing with clustered acceptances is also
saturation submission. After all, authors do not know which jour-
nals their articles would qualify for.5 4 It is only after they have re-
ceived acceptances that they know generally where their articles
could place. Because of this lack of knowledge, the authors have to
treat the law review system as completely random even if it is not.
Without more data allowing for some characterization of the dis-
tribution of acceptances across the journal hierarchy, it is not pos-
sible to estimate the harm to the poorly-resourced. What can be
said is that the harm from the lack of correlation between article
merit and acceptance is even greater than the harm from the ina-
bility of journals to publish all meritorious articles.55
C. Implications of the Real-World Law Review System
The definition of marketization is the exposure of a system to
market forces.5 6 The above discussion demonstrates that the addi-
tion of the two realistic constraints results in the marketization of
the idealized law review system because they magnify the reward
in article placement for those who can pay more.
To that end, it must be noted that the idealized law review sys-
tem, even with the two realistic constraints, is still not fully mar-
ketized. The system naturally imposes a ceiling in spending; there
are only 100 journals in the system. There is therefore a maximum
number of submissions and a maximum amount of submission fees.
53. It should be noted that there is some indication that lower-ranked law journals do
reject articles from authors affiliated with higher-ranked schools. The question of how au-
thor credentials and article quality relate to one another is a controversy that is beyond the
scope of this article.
54. If authors knew how their articles would place ahead of time, they would be able to
work to improve their articles to achieve a higher placement.
55. The reader is invited to try the tabulation of Table 1 and Table 2 using the example
calculations but with different probability assumptions, for example, one acceptance in the
40's, zero in the 50's, two in the 60's, etc.
56. Marketization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
marketization (last visited Sept. 6, 2017).
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Once a particular legal scholar pays for saturation submission, he
or she joins an elite group that is immune from market forces. This
upper limit preserves a meritocracy, but only for scholars who par-
ticipate in saturation submission.
Do these market dynamics apply in the real-world law review
system? In the real-world, there are far more than 100 journals. In
theory, given the many hundreds of journals to submit to, there is
complete and total marketization. Nonetheless, from a practical
point of view, there is a limited number of journals that "matter" to
legal scholars. It is worthwhile to consider this dialogue on
PrawfsBlawg:
I've got an offer that expires today from a journal which is
just . . . ok ..... I can't decide whether it is madness at this
point in the cycle to turn down the only firm offer I have in
favor of hopefully placing somewhere better. As back-
ground, I'm in a good-but temporary-teaching job now,
and plan to go on the market this fall. I'm already pub-
lished, but nowhere particularly impressive. Any thoughts
or advice would be greatly appreciated. (And any more in-
sight into AnonProf's list of journals that are "going to hurt
you," would be welcome, too!)
Posted by: ALurkerNoLonger5 7
What will "hurt you" is entirely relative. If you are already
published, the question I would ask is whether the current
offer is from a journal appreciably higher ranked than your
previous placement(s). If no, I would let the offer lapse (af-
ter attempting to negotiate an extension, of course). Add-
ing yet another publication at a similar rank will not add
much to your candidacy (in part because the expected
placement of a listed "work in progress" will be roughly
that).
Posted by: anon58
57. ALurkerNoLonger, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 25,
2016, 9:26 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2016/comments/page/5/#comments. For more on this subject, see Cicchini, supra note
8.
58. anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 25, 2016, 9:35 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-spring-2016/com-
ments/page/5/#comments. For more on this subject, see Cicchini, supra note 8.
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In terms of what will "hurt you," I would stay away from
any journal whose school is unaccredited or ranked in the
fourth tier. I also wouldn't publish in a specialty at any
school not in the top 10 (unless that journal just happens to
have a particularly great reputation . . .), and I also
wouldn't publish in a speciality [sic] journal that's less than
five years in existence. In short, I would aim for at least a
top 100 general placement.
Posted by: AnonProf59
At the outset, it is a horrendous distortion of academic values
that publication in lowly-ranked journals is considered harmful to
scholarly careers. It also runs contrary to any pedagogic principle
to have lowly-ranked journals discussed as if they were porno-
graphic publications, to have real-world, good faith student editors
at lowly-ranked schools treated as the dalit of law students. There
are many reasons why students end up in law schools ranked below
100 on the U.S. News & World Report, but their inability to pick
good articles for publication and to "Bluebook" and cite-check law
review articles are unlikely to be among the top reasons.
But however distasteful it is, the dialogue reflects the belief and
practice within the legal academia, which we must accept in any
empirical discussion about the matter. And we can infer that, in
practice, there is a limited number of journals that scholars want to
publish in; the total number of journals in the entire real-life law
review system may be irrelevant. The assumption of 100 journals
in the idealized system may be a bit restrictive, but, based on the
above-cited comments from PrawfsBlawg, the number is not an un-
reasonable estimate of the number of journals that "matter."
Accordingly, we can conclude that the dual-track market dynam-
ics predicted in the idealized system may exist in real-life. And, to
that end, legal scholars must wrestle with the idea that, unlike any
other academic discipline, their publication system is a market
which rewards the maximum payment of submission fees. In the
United States, we generally accept the idea that those with more
money can buy and get more. But when is this advantage too much?
Perhaps we may find it acceptable that authors with only $100 to
spend on submissions be published in journals 10 ranks below
where they could have published had they $300 to spend. But what
59. AnonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 25, 2016, 9:44
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-spring-2016/
comments/page/5/#comments. For more on this subject, see Cicchini, supra note 8.
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if the disadvantage results in a 50 rank drop? At what point does
the correlation between the size of budgets for article submission
and the resulting placement of articles interfere with the overall
aims of the academic community, which, presumably, are not re-
lated to the amount of money an author can spend?
It is also important to consider the identity of the players in the
real-world law review system. As stated above, those who can best
afford saturation submission are professors or law firm partners
who can expense the submission fees. These are, for lack of a better
word, the "insiders" among the legal scholars.60 Those who are least
likely to afford saturation submission, in contrast, are those who
are on the faculty job market or in government employment and
have to pay the fees out of their own pockets. These "outsiders" are
the ones subjected to the marketization of the law review system
while the "insiders" are not.
The disparate impact of marketization on "outsiders" and "insid-
ers" has very serious practical implications for legal scholarship.
First, the quality of the population of "insiders" relies on the success
of "outsiders" in the law review system. After all, it is the "outsid-
ers" who join the "insiders" through the faculty job market. To the
extent that the "outsiders" who succeed in the job market are those
who have more publications in the higher-ranked journals, we must
be troubled by the idea that success in the law review system is at
least in part a factor of the ability and willingness to spend on sub-
mission fees.
We must also note that purchasing success in the law journals is
not cheap. The recent tightening of the faculty job market has re-
sulted in the need for applicants to have longer publication records
to succeed in their job search. It is difficult to ascertain exactly how
60. As extensively documented by Cicchini, some of these "insiders" have the practice of
submitting to lower-ranked journals even when they have no intention of ever accepting any
offer of publication from these journals. Cicchini, supra note 8. These scholars merely use
acceptances by lower-ranked journals as a basis for expedites to higher-ranked journals or
as a way to experiment with placement. If they end up with a placement they do not like,
they revise and submit the article again the next submission season. See, e.g., Magnolia,
Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 26, 2017, 4:12 AM), http://prawfs
blawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-2017/comments/page/
10/#comments ("If you hope to go on the market soon, do not chop off 1-39. I would actually
recommend chopping off dozens at the lower end of things, and if the article isnt picked up
thats [sic] a sign you should get more comments and revise the piece. .. . In terms of timing,
I submitted 3/1 last year and received two offers in top 60 and top 35 range. I decided to
revise the piece, and I resubmitted 8/29 and received a top 20 offer 6 days later with no other
offers, thus no expedites."). It is obvious that this submission practice can easily multiply the
costs of submissions. It is unclear how widespread and successful this practice of resubmis-
sion is, but, if such methods were broadly and successfully used by those whose submissions
are subsidized, the impact of article placement would be even more highly affected by the
size of the budgets for submissions.
391
Duquesne Law Review
many articles are needed to secure a job, but it is not too difficult to
imagine that applicants may need to risk several thousand dollars
on submission fees to have a chance at success in their job search.
What kind of person can risk this type of money in such a manner?
And what would happen to legal scholarship as a whole if such per-
sons predominate in the faculty job market?
Second, that the law review system would punish "outsiders" is
effectively a statement hat "outsiders" do not provide valuable con-
tributions to legal scholarship. But that certainly cannot be true
with respect to the applicants for faculty jobs.61 After all, these
''outsiders" are specifically evaluated based on their potential for
contribution to legal scholarship, which is judged from their exist-
ing contribution. It would be a contradiction of the premise of the
faculty job market to treat these "outsiders" as incapable of good
legal scholarship.
But even outside of the subset of legal scholars who are in aca-
demia or who seek to be in academia, judges as well as lawyers
working in government, in public interest organizations, and in law
firms can benefit and advance the state of legal scholarship.62 By
being in practice, they are best placed to comment about the prac-
tice. It should be a matter of concern that the real-life law review
system is systematically biased against the better placement of ar-
ticles from practitioners by the imposition of significant, personal
financial barriers to article submission.63
61. The phenomenon known as "letterhead bias" further disadvantages the "outsiders."
Letterhead bias is the preference among student editors for articles written by law profes-
sors, who are, of course, among the "insiders." It is unclear how widespread and how strong
this bias is among the editors of the various law reviews. It certainly exists to the extent
that some law journals make their bias explicit within their submissions policy. See, e.g.,
Submissions, U. LOUISVILLE L. REV., http://www.louisvillelawreview.org/submissions (last
visited Feb. 6, 2017) ("Except under unusual circumstances, it also is the policy of the [Uni-
versity of Louisville] Law Review not to publish articles ... that have been authored by some-
one other than a full-time law faculty member at an American Bar Association accredited
law school.").
62. Presumably, those who work in law firms are better paid and can better afford the
fees required for saturation submission, even if they were not law firm partners who could
expense the fees altogether.
63. See YesterdaylKilledAMammoth, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Feb. 17, 2017, 12:27 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-
angsting-spring-2017/comments/page/5/#comments ("I think that the Scholastica price hike
is a pretty good indicator that law reviews subs are becoming a closed game. Pretty soon,
practitioners, clerks and profs from lower-ranked schools that don't have much institutional
support won't be able to afford to submit as widely as they need to. This at the time when
the academy is wringing its hands over being too far removed from the actual practice of
law.").
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V. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND PROPOSALS
Legal scholars have basically intuited that they should resort to
saturation submission to deal with the law review system. This ar-
ticle explains that this is indeed the correct strategy because more
submissions help ensure a higher placement.
However, this article goes further and identifies two realities that
result in harm for poorly-resourced authors. First, not all journals
accept all articles that deserve to be accepted. Second, journal rank-
ings do not seem to be strongly correlated to the merit of the arti-
cles.
The first is a simple fact of life. No journal can accept all articles
of any given merit level commensurate to its rank. The second ob-
servation, however, suggests that the existing system may be un-
fair. Moreover, it does potentially suggest that the negative impact
of the peculiarities of the system on poorly-resourced authors can
be rectified by changing how articles are reviewed. There have been
numerous proposals, such as the institution of peer review, which
have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.64 This article does not
intend to add to that discussion.
But to the extent that these two problems cannot be fixed, the
fairness of the system can be improved by democratizing the avail-
ability of saturation submission tactics. For example, instead of
charging authors for each article submitted to each journal, the sys-
tem could be changed to charge authors upon publication.6 5 Charg-
ing authors upon publication allows them to submit to as many
journals as they wish, so long as they can afford the publication
fees, and opens up the availability of saturation submission to all
authors.
Opening saturation submission to all authors, however, means
that all journals have to review more articles. From personal expe-
rience as an articles editor, this author can say with certainty that
journals are already overburdened with article submissions. The
deficiencies of the system cannot be practically remedied by making
reviewing articles more difficult than it already is.
Alternatively, the system can be structured to punish saturation
submission. One way to do so is to increase the fees for additional
submissions. Scholastica at present charges $6.50 for every article
64. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7 ("Ideally, one would like to see the law schools 'take
back' their law reviews, assigning editorial responsibilities to members of the faculty.").
65. This is a common practice in physics journals. See, e.g., Publication Charges and




submitted to a journal. The formula can be changed so that it costs
$4 per submission for the first 10 submissions, $5 for the next 10,
$6 for the next 10, etc., until the 100th submission costs $13. Pun-
ishing saturation submission would not solve the fundamental ar-
bitrariness inherent to journal acceptance, but, to the extent it
would stop authors from submitting to any and all journals in ex-
istence, it would mean that negative effects of such arbitrariness
are borne by all authors and not just those who are poorly-re-
sourced.
An interesting and particularly welcome development to that end
is the increase in the number of journals offering an exclusive sub-
mission track, under which authors agree to exclusively submit
their articles for a set period of time in exchange for an expedited,
but binding, decision on publication.6 6 The exact motivation for this
trend is not clear,67 but it is of significance that these journals ac-
cept articles through free avenues. These exclusive submission
tracks help restore some sense of balance between the poorly-re-
sourced scholars and the infinitely-resourced because they allow
free and open access to all scholars and they impose some costs on
scholars who engage in saturation submission.
One other beneficial fix to the system would be to strengthen the
relationship between journal acceptance and journal rank:
Probabilityacceptance (lower-ranked) Probabilityacceptance (higher-ranked)
A way to do so is to implement a system, within Scholastica, that
allows lower-ranked journals to reject articles for higher-ranked
66. Journals offering an exclusive submission track this season include Northwestern
University Law Review, Buffalo Law Review, and this law journal. Print Submissions, NW.
U. L. REV., http://www.northwesternlawreview.org/submissions (last visited Feb. 6, 2017);
Ari Goldberg, Buffalo Law Review-Volume 65 Exclusive Submission Track, SCHOLASTICA
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://submissions. scholasticahq.com/conversation/questions/buffalo-law-
review-volume-65-exclusive-submission-track; Alfred Brophy, Duquesne Law Review: Exclu-
sive Submission Window, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (Jan. 10, 2017, 4:18 PM), http://www.thefac-
ultylounge.org/20 17/0 1/duquesne-law-review-exclusive-submission-window.html.
67. It has been speculated that this change is a result of journals becoming "tired of being
screeners for [higher-ranked journals]," who "[use] this to lock down a few top authors who
either don't want to play the game or need something published fast." YesterdaylK-
illedAMammoth, Northwestern Law Review Exclusive Submissions, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 29,
2016, 11:12 PM), httz://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/12/northwestern-law-re-
view-exclusive-submissions.html#comments. The problem with higher-ranked law journals
using lower-ranked ones as a screen is a well-recognized evil within the law review system.
Galle, supra note 4, at 5. A full discussion of this subject matter is beyond the scope of this
article.
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journals.68 Journal editors can be presented with these options
when rejecting an article: (1) the article is unacceptable at this jour-
nal and at a journal of higher rank; (2) this article is acceptable but
not of interest to this journal at this time; or (3) no opinion. When
there is more than one rejection on ground (1), an article can be
automatically rejected by Scholastica at all journals ranked higher
than the highest-ranked journal which has rejected an article on
ground (1). For example, if the journal ranked 34 and 18 rejected
an article on ground (1), then that article is automatically rejected
at all journals ranked 18 and higher.69 Such a system would help
ensure that the probability of acceptance at higher-ranked journals
would always be lower than that at lower-ranked journals, reduce
the element of randomness within journal acceptances, and help cut
down on the benefits of saturation submission.
At any rate, the existing incentives of the law review system cre-
ate a market system for the placement of articles in law journals,
which preserves a meritocracy only for those who can afford satu-
ration submission strategies but punishes those who cannot. The
negative effects may be ameliorated, but not fully remedied, with-
out a complete change in these incentives. There sadly appears to
be very little inclination within legal scholarship to alter the struc-
ture of the law review system.
Nonetheless, if we legal scholars do nothing about eliminating
these existing incentives, then we must also concede that legal
scholarship is a game of "pay to play." And if we lazily insist on the
U.S. News & World Report rankings of the schools publishing the
journals publishing a scholar's papers as a proxy of his or her schol-
arship, rather than judge the scholar based on a critical reading of
the actual works, then we have no ground to complain when other
68. Such a proposal would require institutionalizing journal rankings within the fabric
of Scholastica itself. This would be a tragic outcome that rightly would be considered a sur-
render by editors of lower-ranked journals. However, as documented by Cicchini, the lower-
ranked journals are already suffering from extensive abuse and humiliation from legal schol-
ars who incorporate the U.S. News & World Report rankings in their submission practices.
Cicchini, supra note 8. This proposal at the least restores some sense of balance by giving
the editors of lower-ranked journals some formal input into the publication decisions of
higher-ranked journals. Higher-ranked journals would also appreciate this proposal because
it allows them to leverage on the editorial input of lower-ranked journals to filter out unmer-
itorious articles. Indeed, given the widespread reliance in the higher-ranked journals on
expedites from lower-ranked journals to guide their article review process, it is clear that
many higher-ranked journals are comfortable with outsourcing some of their own editorial
discretion to the editors of lower-ranked journals.
69. It is possible to adjust the threshold for automatic rejections to require, say, five jour-
nals to reject an article on ground (1) before automatic rejection is applied at the highest-
ranked journal rejecting the article on ground (1). The threshold is arbitrary and an appro-
priate setting can be found to balance the interests of journals and authors.
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disciplines judge ours as unmeritocratic and look upon our work
with contempt. Indeed, as of now, not even our own field thinks
well of our system:
In regard to summer money being dependent on article
placement, think of how utterly absurd it is that at some
schools the salaries of tenured law professors are to a sig-
nificant extent set by 2Ls, making publishing decisions
about subjects they almost always know next to nothing
about. I'm assuming that people actually read the articles
in tenure files, and make judgments independent of place-
ment, when voting on their colleagues' professional futures.
Oh who am I kidding? What a mess.
Posted by: Another Tenured Prof 70
70. Another Tenured Prof, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 12,
2016, 7:31 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/19/.
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